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FACTS
In November 1992, George Koutsakis, a white male, was stopped by an
Illinois State Police ("ISP") Valkyrie Officer for exceeding the speed limit.'
Valkyrie officers are part of a drug interdiction unit trained to detect and arrest
drug couriers.2 When the officer pulled Koutsakis over, he noticed indications
of drug trafficking such as Koutsakis' red rental car bearing California license
plates.' Inside, the officer saw open maps, fast food wrappers and a mobile
phone.4 Another officer arrived and walked his drug detecting dog around the
car without Koutsakis' consent.5 The officers discovered two hundred pounds
of marijuana and arrested Koutsakis.6 Koutsakis' attorney, Nancy Hollander,
suspected that the ISP stopped drivers based on race or travel patterns.7 In
order to show the ISP's discriminatory practices, Hollander hired plaintiffPeso
Chavez, a private investigator and Hispanic male, to recreate the circumstances
involved in Koutsakis' arrest Katherine Austin, a white female, followed
Chavez to witness the events.9
In February 1993, Larry Thomas, an Illinois State Police Valkyrie Officer,
stopped and detained Chavez on Interstate 80 in Bureau County, Illinois."
Thomas followed Chavez for thirty minutes before stopping him for a traffic
violation." As Thomas approached the car, he noticed that Chavez was
nervous. 12 Chavez drove a red rental car with California license plates. 13 He
had a small suitcase, fast-food wrappers and an atlas, all of which are
indicators of drug trafficking as listed in the Valkyrie training manual.
14
Chavez did not consent to either a search of his vehicle or to a canine walk-
around. 5 Nevertheless, Thomas ignored Chavez and detained him until a
canine unit arrived.' 6 After two walk-arounds, the dog alerted Thomas to the
1. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 623 (7th Cir. 2000).
2. Chavez, 251 F.3d at 621.
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presence of drugs. 7 Thomas subsequently discovered that the vehicle had
made several border crossings in the past year. The officer instructed Chavez
to get out of the car and proceeded to search the vehicle.' 8 Specifically, the
officer searched the car's interior, the wheel wells, the trunk, the engine and
the contents of Chavez's luggage; he did not find any contraband.' 9 After
detaining Chavez for almost an hour, Thomas discharged him with a warning
ticket indicating Chavez's failure to signal.20
In August 1994, Chavez filed a civil rights class action suit individually
and on behalf of other similarly situated persons in U.S. District Court against
defendants Illinois State Police and several individual troopers.2' Chavez
alleged that the ISP engages in the practice of racial profiling by using race to
determine which drivers to stop and detain.22 Soon after Chavez filed his
complaint, Gregory Lee, an African-American male who also claimed to have
been stopped because of his race, was granted leave to join the suit.2 Chavez
charged the defendants with violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the right to travel protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause under Article IV, the Fourth Amendment, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, and Supervisory Liability against certain officers. 4 Plaintiffs
seek damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.
25
Valkyrie Officers belong to a drug interdiction unit part of the ISP and are
trained to detect and apprehend drug couriers.26 The ISP training manual
states that officers may stop drivers for traffic violations, but instructs them not
to use race or ethnicity to decide which motorists to stop.27 Officers are taught
to look at all drivers equally because "drug couriers look pretty much like
everyone else and it is difficult to characterize smugglers on the basis of
nationality. 28 Typically an officer will stop a driver for a traffic violation.
29
After stopping a vehicle, the officer may look for outward and obvious signs
of drug trafficking in plain sight; this does not involve a search of the






22. Id. at 620.
23. Id. at 626.
24. Id at 620.
25. Id.
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length of the driver's trip, maps from drug source cities or states and air
freshener."'" In addition, officers assess the demeanor of the driver and look
for signs of stress, nervousness, or overly friendly behavior.32 If officers find
such indicators, they may request to search the vehicle.33
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 1996, the district court dismissed Chavez's right to travel
claim.34 In November 1998, the district court granted summary judgment to
the defendants on the equal protection and supervisory liability claims35
because Chavez failed to provide sufficient evidence to support aprimafacie
case.3 6 The court then denied Chavez's motion to certify a class of persons
consisting of minorities who were previously and in the future likely to be
unlawfully stopped and detained by the ISP because of their race.37 The court
said that the certification depended on Chavez's equal protection claim, which
was not viable. 8 Therefore, there would be no reason to grant Chavez the
certification.39 The court further added that the plaintiffs could renew their
motion by seeking certification of claims surviving summary judgment.4" In
addition, the court granted qualified immunity to several ISP officers against
plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim."
Almost a year later, Chavez motioned to certify "a class consisting of
persons of Hispanic race and color who had been or would eventually be
stopped and detained in violation of Title VI" of the Civil Rights Act. 2 The
district court denied Chavez's motion because plaintiffs did not show any real
injury43 and consequently lacked standing to seek injunctive relief under Title
VI. 4 The court also denied Chavez's motion to add Christopher Jimenez, a
Hispanic male who claims to have been stopped by the ISP because of his
race, as another plaintiff.45
Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to prevent the ISP from stopping
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 622.
34. Id. at 626.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 648.
37. Id. at 626.
38. Id. at 629.
39. Id
40. Id.
41. Id. at 626.
42. Id.
43. Id
44. Id. at 653.
45. Id. at 627.
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drivers on the basis of race.46 Plaintiffs claimed that the ISP's practice of
discrimination violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
"administrative regulations of the Department of Justice effectuating Title
VI.' '47 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on a
number of the plaintiffs' claims and ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
seek relief under Title VI. 48 As a result, in August 1999, the plaintiffs moved
to voluntarily dismiss all other. claims with prejudice in order to take an
immediate appeal.49 Plaintiffs sought to drop their Fourth Amendment claim,
supplemental state law claims and Title VI statutory and regulatory claims.5 °
The court dismissed Chavez's Title VI regulatory claim stating that a court
may "take appropriate action, with respect to (1) formulation and
simplification of the issues, including eliminating frivolous claims or
defenses."51 The court required plaintiffs to pay reasonable costs for this
dismissal.52 The court also granted plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss
their statutory claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 1(a)(2)53 .54
Chavez moved for reconsideration of the decision to dismiss their statutory
and regulatory claims and for a stay of payment pending appeal.5 The court
only allowed for a stay of payment.56 The plaintiffs now appeal the district
court's grant of summary judgment regarding their equal protection and
supervisory liability claims. 7 Plaintiffs also contest the court's ruling against
Chavez's right to travel claim, the finding that they lack standing under Title
VI for injunctive relief, the denial of their request to include a new plaintiff
(Jimenez) and the costs imposed for voluntary dismissal.58
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined
that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the ISP engages in racial profiling.59 The
Court of Appeals found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion with





51. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
52. Chavez, 251 F.3d at 627.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
54. Chavez, 251 F.3d at 654.
55. Id.at 627.
56. Id. at 628.
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respect to the District Court's procedural decisions that denied plaintiffs' class
certification6" and motion to add a new plaintiff.6 The Court affirmed the
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants with
regard to plaintiffs' equal protection and supervisory liability claims.62 The
court also approved the dismissal of Chavez's right to travel claim.63 Further,
it upheld the District Court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VI claims, stating
that plaintiffs did not have standing for equitable relief.64 Lastly, the court
sustained the District Court's imposition of costs on plaintiffs as a result of
their voluntary dismissal.65
ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings after finding
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.66 In its analysis, the Court
of Appeals first looked at the District Court's procedural rulings.67 It then
focused on the plaintiffs' substantive claims, followed by the District Court's
granting of summary judgment on supervisory liability and plaintiffs'
"challenges to the resolution of their Title VI claims., 6' Lastly, the court
addressed the fees imposed on the plaintiffs resulting from their voluntary
dismissal.69
A. Procedural Rulings
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's decision to deny
plaintiffs' first motion for class certification.7" The Court, however, noted that
"as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine whether it is to be so maintained. 71  The
Court of Appeals preferred this procedure because the outcome of a case
depends on the merits and not class certification. 72  Further, "a quick
60. Id. at 630.
61. Id. at 633.
62. Id. at 612.
63. Id. at 630.
64. Id. at 656.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 655.
67. Id. at 628.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 630.
71. Id. (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c))..
72. Id.
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disposition on the merits is often not possible. 73 Nevertheless, the District
Court's procedural methods merely amount to harmless error because the
plaintiffs' underlying claims lack merit.74 The plaintiffs' second motion for
class certification rested on their Title VI claims.75 The Court of Appeals did
not address this issue because the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion
to dismiss their own Title VI claims.76
Next, the Court of Appeals addressed the District Court's refusal to allow
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint by adding Christopher Jimenez as a
class representative.77 Jimenez, a Hispanic male, claimed that the ISP stopped
him on the basis of his race.78 Both the Appellate and District courts agreed
that Jimenez could be properly joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 2079.80 A court,
however, has discretion to deny leave to amend if it finds there would be
undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party.8' The District Court found that
the plaintiffs knew about Jimenez's claims for almost three years before filing
this motion.82 Moreover, plaintiffs submitted this motion after the discovery
deadline and only five months before trial.83 The District Court determined
that granting this motion would delay the trial and place undue prejudice upon
the defendants. 84 The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion.
B. Plaintiffs' Substantive Claims
To establish a prima facie case under the equal protection clause, the
plaintiffs must show that the defendants' behavior had a discriminatory effect
and that they acted with a discriminatory purpose.86 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment but did not agree
with all of the District Court's. analysis.8 7 Chavez proved that the ISP's acts
had a discriminatory effect on him, but the remaining plaintiffs did not.88
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 627.
76. Id. at 629.
77. Id. at 630.
78. Id.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
80. Id. at 632.
81. Id (discussing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).




86. Id. at 635.
87. Id. at 645.
88. Id.
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Moreover, neither Chavez nor the plaintiffs could show discriminatory intent."
In order to show that the defendants' actions had a discriminatory effect,
the plaintiffs must prove "they are members of a protected class, that they are
similarly situated to members of the unprotected class and that plaintiffs were
treated differently than the members of the unprotected class." The District
Court rejected Chavez's contention that Katherine Austin, a white female, was
similarly situated to him because of the gender difference between the two
drivers, the difference in the cars they drove, and the difference in the contents
of the cars.9 The Court of Appeals disagreed.92 First, both were driving on
the same highway at the same time without committing any traffic violations.93
Second, officers cannot stop drivers based on either gender or race.94 Third,
Thomas did not stop Chavez because of the type of car he drove.95 Fourth,
Thomas did not stop Chavez based on the contents of Chavez's car because
Thomas could not see inside until he pulled over.96 Lastly, Thomas followed
both cars and chose to stop Chavez instead of Austin. 97 The Court of Appeals
determined that Austin is a "similarly situated individual part of an
unprotected class who was treated differently from Chavez," which shows that
defendants' action had a discriminatory effect on him.98
Plaintiffs contend that African-American and Hispanic drivers are targeted
for stops more often than white drivers.9 The plaintiffs primarily relied on
Valkyrie field reports and the citations and warnings database. °0 Valkyrie
reports allow the ISP to indicate the race of the motorist, but officers do not
always include this information.'0 ' The reports are used in limited
circumstances such as arrests, discovery of drugs and other Valkyrie matters.'02
The citations and warnings database accounts for all the citations and warnings
issued, but does not keep a records of the race of each driver stopped.0 3 In
fact, the ISP does not have record of all motorists stopped."° The Court of
Appeals said the reports were unreliable, and not enough to constitute an
89. Id. at 648.
90. Id. at 636.
91. Id.
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100. Id. at 642.
101. Id. at 625.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 643.
104. Id at 642.
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adequate sample." 5
The plaintiffs also compared the number of white, African-American and
Hispanic drivers stopped with the amount of people that make up these races
in the Illinois population and on the Illinois roads. 6 The plaintiffs compared
the 1990 census reports to the Valkyrie reports.'0 7 The court, however, noted
that census reports tend to undercount the number of African-Americans and
Hispanics. 0 8 The 1990 census may not have accurately reflected the amount
of African-Americans and Hispanics living in Illinois during the relevant
period. 9 Consequently, the court ruled that these statistics were unreliable
and failed to show a discriminatory effect."o
The Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiffs did not prove that the
defendants acted with discriminatory intent."' Chavez asserted that the officer
who searched his car admitted that race is something that officers keep in
mind." 2 But, Chavez later told Hollander that the officer's remark did not
seem racially motivated.' ' 3 Further, Thomas' field report indicated that
Chavez was white." 4 Although officers have admitted they are not precluded
from using race to decide which drivers to stop," 5 plaintiffs argue that the ISP
will not investigate cases involving racial claims." 6 Plaintiffs also assert that
Valkyrie training manuals state that Hispanics are frequently found to be drug
transporters.' Additionally, between the years 1990-1994, statistics revealed
that Hispanics and African-Americans accounted for over sixty percent of
drivers detained and searched in the sixth district of Illinois." 8 Despite these
allegations, the court discovered evidence to the contrary." 9 The court found
that the training materials never approved the use of race as an indicator, but
instead condemned officers who did.' 0
Plaintiffs claimed that during officers' training sessions, Michael Snyders,
the former statewide Valkyrie coordinator, taught officers to use race to decide
105. Id. at 644.
106. Id. at 643.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 644.
110. Id. at 641.
111. Id. at 648.
112. Id. at 646.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 645-646.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 645.
117. Id.
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which drivers to stop.' 2' More specifically, plaintiffs contend that Snyders
made "references to drug distribution by Hispanics."'1 2 However, neither the
training manuals and tapes nor such comments show that officers were taught
to stop drivers because of their race. 123 Further, the court stated that to hold
Snyders liable, plaintiffs would have to show he was in a supervisory position,
aware of the officers' conduct and failed to intervene to prevent discriminatory
or unconstitutional behavior. 124 The Court of Appeals found that the act of
training officers does not constitute such a position.'25 "The fact that a student
allegedly discriminates does not necessarily mean the student's former teacher
taught the student to discriminate."' 26 After reviewing the plaintiffs' evidence
regarding their supervisory liability claim, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
grant of summary judgment.1
27
Even though the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Chavez's right
to travel claims, its reasons differed from the District Court. 128 The District
Court determined that Chavez's claims only dealt with intrastate travel, not
interstate travel. 29 It refused to equate interstate travel rights with intrastate
rights and therefore dismissed Chavez's claim. 3 ° The Court of Appeals
disagreed with this analysis stating that the right to travel "embraces different
components" such as the right of out of state residents to enter and leave other
states and the right to be treated as a "welcome visitor."'' The Court of
Appeals, however, determined that the ISP did not preclude Chavez from
either entering or exiting the state. 32 Stopping someone because of their race
does not establish a right to travel claim. ' Moreover, the court explained that
the privileges and immunities clause is used to prevent discrimination toward
out of state residents.'34 The court further stated that it does not apply to
Chavez because his complaint failed to allege discrimination against out of
state residents.'3 5 Instead, he claims that the ISP discriminates against all
African-Americans and Hispanics regardless of their state citizenship.'36
121. Id. at 652.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 652-653.
124. Id. at 651-652.
125. Id. at 651.
126. Id at 653.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 648.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 653.
131. Id.
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Based on the given facts, the Court of Appeals found no support for Chavez's
claims.'
Plaintiffs claimed that the ISP's practice of stopping and detaining drivers
based on their race violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the
administrative regulations effectuating Title VI."3' Plaintiffs sought
prospective relief and an injunction to impede the ISP from maintaining such
discriminatory practices.'39 The District Court, however, determined that the
plaintiffs did not have standing for equitable relief due to a lack of any "real
and immediate threat of injury."'140 As a result, plaintiffs moved to voluntarily
dismiss their Title VI regulatory and statutory claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(a)(2) with prejudice to simplify the issues remaining for adjudication.' 4 '
The District Court granted this motion and imposed costs upon the plaintiffs. 1
42
On appeal, however, plaintiffs requested the Court of Appeals to reinstate their
Title VI claims arguing that the District Court erred by ruling they lacked
standing for injunctive relief. 43 "When a District Court grants voluntary
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a),' a plaintiff has neither the reason nor
right to appeal the dismissal because the plaintiff received the relief
requested."'' 45 The Court of Appeals said that it could not reinstate claims that
were voluntarily dismissed and therefore declined to review this matter.
146
Further, the Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of costs on the
plaintiffs. 47 It noted that a court may order whatever "terms and conditions"
it considers appropriate to grant a voluntary dismissal. 4 '
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings because the
plaintiffs were unable to prove that Valkyrie officers stop and detain drivers
on the basis of racial or ethnic profiling. 49 More specifically, the field reports
and citations and warnings database, which plaintiffs relied on, did not identify
the race of each driver and thus does not allow for an inference of
137. Id. at 650.
138. Id. at 653.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 654.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 654.
144. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a)(2).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 655.
148. Id. (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)).
149. Chavez, 251 F.3dat656.
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discrimination.' 50 Furthermore, the court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to
provide sufficient evidence showing that officers are taught to use race to
determine which drivers to stop.' 5'
In State of New Jersey v. Soto 52 the court granted plaintiffs' motion to
suppress evidence after establishing a prima facie case of selective
enforcement."' The court based its decision partially on statistics presented
by the defendants that showed the presence of racism within the state police.'54
Unlike the statistics presented by Chavez, the defendants here were able to
identify the race of a substantial number of drivers.' 55 For two weeks the
defense counted over 42,000 vehicles at four designated sites on the New
Jersey turnpike to determine the number African-Americans who were either
driving or in the passenger seat.'56 13.5% of the vehicles were found to have
an African-American occupant.'57 The defense counted the number of vehicles
committing traffic violations and found little disparity between blacks and
whites.15 They then inspected arrest reports, patrol charts, traffic tickets and
radio logs and found that 39.6% constituted race identified stops.5 9 The
defendants compared the numbers and found that 46.2% of the stops were of
African-American drivers. 160  After further examination, the defendants
calculated that African-Americans were 4.85 times as likely as whites to be
stopped in the designated areas.16' The statistics offered by Chavez were
insufficient because the sample pool was too small, the ISP maintained poor
records and were thus unable to make such comparisons as the defense did in
Soto. 1
62
Statistics showing that a disproportionate amount of minorities were
stopped by officers cannot alone prove discrimination. However, such
statistics allow a court to infer that officers may have engaged in racial
profiling, and establishes a primafacie case. 63 Without having to provide
detailed reports about each driver, officers may abuse their discretion when
150. Id. at612.
151. Id.
152. State of New Jersey v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (1996).
153. Soto, 734 A.2d at 360, 361.
154. Id. at 360.
155. Id. at 352.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 353.
159. Id. at 352.
160. Id. at 353.
161. Id
162. Chavez, 251 F.3d at 641-645.
163. See Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) ("The District judge found that Partida had made
out a bare primafacie case of invidious discrimination based on a statistical showing." The Supreme Court
reviewed the statistics and found that Partida established aprimafacie case.).
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stopping drivers. In 1997, Representative John Conyers of Michigan
introduced a bill that would require the Department of Justice to analyze data,
including the race of the driver, on all traffic stops nationwide."6 The National
Organization of Police Organizations opposed the bill stating that officers
resented having to collect such data.'65 Consequently, the bill did not pass.'66
Nevertheless, this creates the presumption that racial profiling occurs quite
often.
Forcing officers to keep detailed records, however, may provide some
deterrence against racial profiling. For example, in Maryland, officers must
keep record of all vehicles stopped, the driver's race, time, location and if the
officer searched the car.'67 New Jersey entered into a consent decree with the
Department of Justice to prevent racial profiling. 6 ' The decree mandates that
the state create a management awareness program to "identify and modify
problematic behavior and promote best practices."'69 The police must keep
detailed records such as the gender/race of the driver, if a ticket was issued, if
there was a request to search the vehicle and for what reason, if the driver was
subject to force, etc. 7° A number of states including Connecticut, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia and Arkansas are making efforts to address
racial profiling by introducing bills modeled after Representative Conyers'
bill.' 7 '
Officers have discretion to stop drivers for traffic violations. To detain a
driver for a suspected crime, the officer must have reasonable suspicion based
on "specific and articulable facts."'72 Race should not determine whether an
officer decides to search a car. Officers in Chavez, however, admit they are
not precluded from using race as a factor to determine whether to stop a
driver. 73 Further, in Soto, Brian Caffrey, the assistant supervisor of the drug
interdiction unit, testified that "ethnicity is something to keep in mind," when
stopping drivers.'74 Caffrey also testified that attendees of state police training
164. David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics And The Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters,
84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 276 (1999).
165. Id. at 276.
166. See id.
167. Kathleen M. Oday, Comments: Pretextual Traffic Stops: Protecting Our Streets or Racist Police
Tactics? 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 333. (1998).
168. Whitev. Williams, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216, *19.
169. Williams, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *20.
170. Id. at *20.
171. See supra note 193, at 321.
172. Oday, supra note 167, at 323 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1968) ("The Supreme
Court emphasized that the demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated
is the central teaching of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.")
173. Chavez, 251 F.3d at 645.
174. Soto, 734 A.2d at 358.
[Vol. 8:1
Chavez v. Illinois State Police
sessions are taught that Hispanics are mainly involved in drug trafficking.' 75
In addition, films depicting blacks and Hispanics as those who are mainly
arrested for drug trafficking were shown at the training sessions.'76 Such
training methods encourage officers to target blacks and Hispanics and may
produce racist cops. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated that "reasonable
suspicion should be based on the totality of the circumstances."'77 This
increases an officer's discretion and may enable them to use traffic violations
as an excuse to stop drivers based on race.'78 .We should also consider whether
evidence of open maps and fast food wrappers -found in vehicles justify a
search by the ISP. These items can be found in many vehicles, which may
enable the ISP to hide behind these factors to promote racist motives. It is
difficult to determine an officer's subjective intent. However, if officers are
forced to keep better records and provide detailed reports, officers may think
twice before randomly stopping a driver based on race.




177. Oday, supra note 167, at 322-323 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)
"Reasonable suspicion should be based on the totality of the circumstances. Now, because courts look at
the totality of the circumstances, police officers' possible racial prejudice may be easily hidden.").
178. Id.
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